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I. INTRODUCTION
During the survey period there were some significant developments
in the area of Florida Civil Procedure. The first development occurred
in the area of subject matter jurisdiction. As of October 1, 1990, the
subject matter jurisdiction of the county court was increased, both as to
the jurisdictional amount in controversy and as to the county court's
power to hear "matters in equity."' Although the overall scope of the
changes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the county courts is not
totally clear, the changes do warrant discussion.
The Florida Supreme Court also decided a significant case con-
cerning jurisdiction over the person. In Venetian Salami Co. v.
Parethenais,2 the court clarified the procedure to be followed when
resolving disputed factual issues relating to jurisdiction over the person.
The court approved the use of brief evidentiary trial court hearings to
resolve disputed issues of fact concerning in personam jurisdiction.3
Florida's highest court also addressed the continuing problems of
general and specific jurisdiction over the person: specifically, whether
the Florida long-arm statutes require a relationship between a cause of
action and the activities of a defendant corporation in the state (con-
nexity) when the corporation has designated a residential agent for ser-
vice of process in conjunction with its license to do business within the
state.4 In White v. Pepsico,5 the court held that the Florida statutes did
not require "connexity" between the cause of action and activities of
the defendant corporation.
Developments in other areas of Florida Civil Practice were not as
* Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law; LL.M., Yale Uni-
versity, 1959; J.D., University of Iowa College of Law, 1955; B.S., Iowa State Univer-
sity, 1952. Special thanks to Robert Pinder and Sharon DiMuro for assisting with this
article.
1. See infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
2. 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989).
3. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 37-63 and accompanying text.
5. 568 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1990).
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conspicuous as those in the jurisdictional area. However, a survey of
recent appellate decisions in the areas of venue,6 disqualification of
judges,7 pleadings," discovery, 9 default, 10 dismissal," offer of judg-
ment, 2 summary judgment,'" directed verdict,' 4 prejudgment inter-
est, 15 costs and interest,'16 attorney's fees,' 7 and res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel 8 have been included for a review of the trends developing
in those areas. Among these topics, the Florida Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Aspen v. Bayless'9 (concerning the recovery of costs paid by a
third party) and the court's discussion of attorney's fees in Standard
Guarantee Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom2" are well worth considering.
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER: CHANGES IN
COUNTY COURT JURISDICTION
Effective October 1, 1990,21 the county court's jurisdictional
amount in controversy was increased from $5,000 to $10,000, exclusive
of interest, costs and attorney's fees.22 The amended statute also in-
6. See infra notes 88-111 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 112-130 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 131-57 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 158-205 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 206-25 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 226-55 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 265-76 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 277-85 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 286-95 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 296-301 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 302-15 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 316-25 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 326-39 and accompanying text.
19. 564 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1990).
20. 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990).
21. There was a textual ambiguity on the face of the new law. The new law
purported to take effect on both July 1, 1990 and October 1, 1990. The Florida
Supreme Court, by administrative order, resolved this conflict in favor of the later date.
Administrative Order, In Re County Court Jurisdiction (Fla. July 3, 1990)
(unpublished).
22. 1990 Fla. Laws 269, codified at FLA. STAT. § 34.01(I)(c)(3) (Supp. 1990).
Section 34.01 now reads:
Jurisdiction of county court
(1) County courts shall have original jurisdiction:
(a) In all misdemeanor cases not cognizable by the circuit courts;
(b) Of all violations of municipal and county ordinances; and
(c) As to causes of action accruing:
[Vol. 15
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creases the amount in controversy to $15,000 for causes of action ac-
cruing on or after July 1, 1992.23
The amendments to Florida Statute section 34.01 also expand the
county court's jurisdiction in equitable matters. The revised statute
states that "[j]udges of county courts may hear all matters in equity
involved in any case within the jurisdictional amount of the county
court, except as otherwise restricted by the State Constitution or Laws
I. Before July 1, 1980, of all actions at law in which the matter in contro-
versy does not exceed the sum of $2,500, exclusive of interest, costs, and
attorney's fees, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit
courts.
2. On or after July 1, 1980, of all actions at law in which the matter in
controversy does not exceed the sum of $5,000, exclusive of interest, costs,
and attorney's fees, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
circuit courts.
3. On or after July 1, 1990, of actions at law in which the matter in con-
troversy does not exceed the sum of $10,000, exclusive of interest, costs,
and attorney's fees, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
circuit courts.
4. On or after July 1, 1992, of actions at law in which the matter in con-
troversy does not exceed the sum of $15,000, exclusive of interest, costs,
and attorney's fees, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
circuit courts.
The party instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding pursuant to this
schedule where the amount in controversy is in excess of $5,000 shall pay
to the clerk of the county court the filing fees and service charges in the
same amounts and in the same manner as provided in § 28.241
(2) The county court shall have jurisdiction previously exercised by county
judges' courts other than that vested in the circuit court by § 26.012, ex-
cept that county court judges may hear matters involving dissolution of
marriage under the simplified dissolution procedure pursuant to Rule
1.611 (c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure or may issue a final order for
dissolution in cases where the matter is uncontested, and the jurisdiction
previously exercised by county courts, the claims court, small claims
courts, small claims magistrates courts, pal courts, and courts of chartered
counties, including but not limited to the counties referred to in §§ 9, 10,
11, and 24 of Art. VIII of the State Constitution, 1885.
(3) Judges of county court shall be committing magistrates. Judges of
county courts shall be coroners unless otherwise provided by law or by rule
of the Supreme Court.
(4) Judges of county courts may hear all matters in equity involved in any
case within the jurisdictional amount of the county court, except as other-
wise restricted by the State Constitution or the laws of Florida.
FLA. STAT. § 34.01 (Supp. 1990).
23. Id. at § 34.01(I)(c)(4).
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of Florida. ' 24 These recent amendments have created some ambiguity
concerning the application of the revised statute. While the former
statute allowed the assertion of "equitable defenses," and the amend-
ment's language would allow counterclaims, it is unclear whether a
permissive equitable counterclaim is within the purview of the 1990
amendments to the statute. Although the statutory language has been
broadened by the amendments, there is not an expressed indication that
an equitable permissive counterclaim could now be considered by the
county court. Also, the revised statute does not make it clear whether
the transfer of an action to the circuit court is now precluded when an
equitable counterclaim is asserted.
Other questions flowing from the 1990 amendments include: first,
whether or not the county court may now hear a compulsory equitable
counterclaim that exceeds $10,000; and, second, what prccedure does
the county court use to determine whether or not a permissive equitable
counterclaim is greater, or less, than $10,000. The answer to the first
question appears to be "no" in light of the fact that the statute restricts
the county court to equitable matters "within the jurisdictional
amount" of the court. However, the statute does not expressly address
compulsory counterclaims, and a different construction of' the statute
may later emerge. As to the second question, under the prior statute,
Florida courts did not have to value equitable permissive counterclaims
because the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.
Assuming the amended statute is construed to require such valuation,
the discussion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit - determining the federal jurisdictional amount in an injunc-
tion case - in McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co, 25 provides an example
of the proper method for determining the value of an equitable counter-
claim. However, evaluating the monetary value of equitable claims is
often fraught with difficulties as it involves the complicated process of
evaluating intangible equitable rights.
Until there is a judicial construction of the new statute, it is this
author's opinion that the better course is to err on the side of caution
and construe the statute narrowly. Such a construction, in essence,
would view the amendments as a supplementary grant of jurisdiction to
24. Id. at § 34.01(4). Compare this new language with former section
34.01(1)(c)(2) which simply stated that "[a]ll equitable defenses in a case properly
before a county court may be tried in the same proceeding." FLA. STAT. §
34.01(1)(e)(2)(1989) (amended 1990).
25. 595 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1979).
[Vol. 15
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the county court to hear only limited equitable matters. This approach
would allow the county court to hear equitable claims arising out of the
same transaction of the case, but would not vest the county court with
exclusive jurisdiction over all equitable claims properly joined as addi-
tional counts to the plaintiff's claim or that could be asserted by way of
permissive counterclaims. Also, this construction would permit the
transfer of the action to the circuit court.
The recent amendments also addressed some other issues. County
courts are now empowered to hear, or decide, certain dissolution of
marriage proceedings.2 6 Further, Florida Statute section 86.011 was
amended to comply with the county court's increased equitable juris-
diction. The county court is now expressly granted "jurisdiction
within [its] respective jurisdictional amount[s] to declare rights, status,
and other equitable or legal relations whether or not further relief is or
could be claimed. 2
8
III. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
A. Procedures for Determination of Jurisdiction
In Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais,2 9 the Florida Supreme
Court clarified the procedure to be followed in resolving disputed fact
issues governing jurisdiction over the person. Florida requires the plain-
tiff to plead facts upholding jurisdiction over a non-resident served
outside the state. The pleading requirement, and the confusion as to
whether ultimate or evidentiary facts must be pled, 30 was greatly sim-
26. 1990 Fla. Laws 269, codified at FLA. STAT. § 34.01(2) (Supp. 1990).
27. 1990 Fla. Laws 269.
28. FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (Supp. 1990).
29. 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989).
30. The commentary to the 1980 Amendment to Rule 1.070 addresses this
confusion:
1980 Amendment. Subdivision (i) is added in 1980 to eliminate pleading
evidentiary facts for "long-arm" service of process. It is based on the long
standing principle in service by publication that pleading the basis for ser-
vice is sufficient if it is done in the language of the statute. See McDaniel
v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926). Confusion has been generated
in the decisions under the "long-arm" statute. See Wm. E. Strasser Con-
struction Corp. v. Linn 97 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1957); Hartman Agency, Inc.
v. Indiana Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., 353 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1978), and Drake v. Scharlau, 353 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978). The amendment is not intended to change the distinction be-
1991]
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plified by the 1980 amendments adding Rule 1.070(i), allowing the
pleading to track the language of the long-arm statute.3 ' When the
plaintiff has pled the statutory language under which jurisdiction is
claimed, the defendant who desires to oppose jurisdiction must file evi-
dentiary affidavits contesting the factual basis for jurisdiction. Once the
plaintiff's pleadings are challenged by the defendant's affidavit, the
burden of proof to establish, by evidentiary facts, the existence of juris-
diction is upon the plaintiff. Traditionally this has been done in several
ways: attaching supporting affidavits to the complaint; filing separate
affidavits; and using discovery materials. This paper wa: often pro-
duced conflicting affidavits concerning an identical evidentiary fact. In
Venetian Salami, the court required the trial court to conduct a live
evidentiary hearing to resolve disputes. 2 This hearing enables the trial
court to judge credibility, weight of the evidence, and resolve the
conflict.
Discovery, including interrogatories and requests for admissions,
as well as depositions, can be an important tool for the plaintiff in gath-
ering information to satisfy the burden of proof at the jurisdictional
hearing. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court upheld, as a sanc-
tion for the defendant's failure to respond to interrogatories, the strik-
ing of the defense of lack of jurisdiction. 3 In view of the Venetian Sa-
lami decision, the use of discovery and brief but evidentiary trial court
hearings to determine jurisdiction over the person will be the rule
rather than the exception. Appellate courts should give deference to the
trial court's resolution of fact issues, although the question of law that
tween pleading and proof as enunciated in Elmex Corp. v. Atlantic Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Association of Fort Lauderdale, 325 So. 2d 58 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. .1976). It is intended to eliminate the necessity of plead-
ing evidentiary facts as well as those of pecuniary benefit that were used in
the Elmex case. The amendment is limited to pleading. If the statutory
allegations are attacked by motion, the pleader must then prove the evi-
dentiary facts to support the statutory requirements. If denied in a plead-
ing, the allegations must be proved at trial. Otherwise, the allegations will
be admitted under Rule 1.110(e).
31. Rule 1.070(i) states: "[W]hen service of process is to be made under statutes
authorizing service on non-residents of Florida, it is sufficient to plead the basis for
service in the language of the statute without pleading the facts supporting service."
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1070(i).
32. Venetian, 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989).
33. Insurance Corp. of Ireland Ltd. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 707 (1982).
[Vol. 15
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may be involved would be reviewed de' novo.34
In Devaney v. Solitron Devices, Inc.,35 the court reversed on due
process grounds, the trial court's determination of jurisdiction at a
hearing noticed for other purposes. The jurisdictional hearing in Deva-
ney had been scheduled for a later date and the court held that it was
error to determine the jurisdictional question at a hearing noticed only
for motions to compel discovery. 36
B. Connexity: The Problems of General and Specific
Jurisdiction
In White v. Pepsico Inc.,"7 the Florida Supreme Court answered a
jurisdictional question certified by the Eleventh Circuit 38 as to whether
Florida long-arm statutes required a relationship between the cause of
action and the defendant corporation's activities in Florida ("connex-
ity") where the corporation had designated a residential agent for ser-
vice of process in Florida in conjunction with its license to do business
in the state.39 The supreme court ruled that the Florida statute did not
require connexity.40 The Eleventh Circuit only certified the question as
to the construction and meaning of the Florida statute, not to question
whether federal due process would require connexity. In this respect, it
has long been held that a state, if it so chooses, could subject a foreign
corporation that has appointed a resident agent for service of process to
general in personam jurisdiction over causes of action that have no re-
34. Mercedes Lighting and Electrical Supply, Inc., v. Department of Gen. Serv.,
560 So. 2d 272, 277 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990); compare Alexander Proudfoot Co.
v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912 (lth Cir. 1989).
35. 564 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
36. Id. at 1229-30.
37. 568 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1990).
38. The Eleventh Circuit certified the following question:
WHETHER, IN ACTIONS THAT ACCRUED BEFORE 1984, SER-
VICE ON A REGISTERED AGENT PURSUANT TO FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 48.081(3) and 48.091(1) [1983] CONFERRED UPON A
COURT PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A FOREIGN CORPO-
RATION WITHOUT A SHOWING THAT A CONNECTION EX-
ISTED BETWEEN THE CAUSE OF ACTION AND THE CORPO-
RATION'S ACTIVITIES IN FLORIDA.
White v. Pepisco, Inc., 866 F.2d 1325, 1326 (lth Cir. 1989).
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lationship to the forum.41
Service upon a foreign corporation's resident agent in the state is
analogous, if not tantamount, to jurisdiction over a foreign citizen who
is personally served with process in the state. The United States Su-
preme Court in Burnham v. Superior Court of California,42 reaffirmed
a state's power over a transient non-resident, personally served within
the state, notwithstanding that the transient actions of the defendant
within the state were not the basis of the cause of action asserted.43
General versus specific concepts of jurisdiction have been the
source of confusion and debate. The Florida Supreme Court in White
quoted the definition offered by the United States Supreme Court in
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall:44
When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a
suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with
the forum, the State has been said to be exercising 'general juris-
diction' over the defendant.' General jurisdiction is to be distin-
guished from 'specific jurisdiction,' which occurs 'when a State ex-
ercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of
or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum. 45
In view of the Florida Supreme Court's citation to both
Helicopteros46 and Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,41
some additional comments are necessary. Unlike White v. Pepsico Inc.,
the corporations in Perkins and Helicopteros had not obtained a license
to do business in the forum state and consequently had not appointed a
resident agent for service of process. Thus, neither .Perkins nor
Helicopteros is apropos concerning the issue decided in White.
In Perkins, the foreign corporation was generally carrying on all of
its business activities in Ohio, and had, as a practical, matter ceased all
business operations in the Philippines. The United States Supreme
Court held that federal due process would not bar Ohio courts from
41. Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 441 (1952).
42. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
43. Id. at 2111.
44. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
45. 568 So. 2d at 888 n.3 (citations omitted).
46. 568 So. 2d at 888 n.3 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)).
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exercising jurisdiction over the foreign corporation that was generally
and systematically carrying on business activities in Ohio, even though
the cause of action was in relation to matters which had occurred in the
Philippines.48
In Helicopteros, the United States Supreme Court held that more
than a million dollars worth of business activities by the foreign entities
in Texas were not the equivalent of the general and systematic activi-
ties of Benguet Mining in Ohio, and refused to extend the Perkins doc-
trine of general jurisdiction.49 The plaintiffs in Helicopteros (wrongful
death actions for a helicopter crash in Peru) did not argue "specific"
jurisdiction (i.e. the purchase of the helicopter, obtaining parts, and
training of pilots, all in Texas, was related to the cause of action), and
instead relied upon the concept of general jurisdiction.
Helicopteros, by limiting the theory of general jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation (that does not have a resident agent) to the Perkins
quality and quantum of facts, has eliminated practical utilization of the
concept. Perhaps the problem is that the dichotomy of general and spe-
cific jurisdictional theories is so deceptively simple. Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court in wrestling with substantiality of minimum con-
tacts for specific jurisdiction has found two separate aspects: first, the
question of what constitutes power; and second, the question of what is
reasonable if such power exists.
The question of whether the activities of the foreign corporation
that took place in the forum state were the basis for the cause of ac-
tion, was clear in International Shoe Co. v. Washington."0 That case
spawned the recognition of the "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" test, a wonderfully warm usage of constitutional
prose that promotes flexibility rather than certainty.5 In Hanson v.
Denckla,52 the question of the relationship between the trustees' con-
duct in Florida and the cause of action was more ambivalent with the
Court, more by judicial fiat than analysis. The Court determined that
there were no contacts in Florida because the claim concerned the va-
lidity of the power of appointment of a trust that had been created in
Delaware.53 That the power of appointment had been executed in Flor-
48. Id.
49. 466 U.S. at 416.
50. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
51. 326 U.S. at 316 (citations omitted).
52. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
53. Id. at 251.
1991] 1001
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ida, and the will probated in Florida, were not consensual minimum
contacts because the legal question was whether the appointment
clause of the Delaware trust authorized it to be exercised by a will.5 4
Although Hanson took a narrow view of what activities may be
deemed related to the claim for relief, this question of the relationship
is not easily resolved. A case of substantial interest to Florida's cruise
line business is now pending before the United States Supreme Court.55
The Court is reviewing a Ninth Circuit decision upholding jurisdiction
over a passenger's Washington action for a slip and fall aboard ship in
international waters off the coast of Mexico.56 Unlike Helicopteros,
special jurisdiction is claimed upon the relationship of the business ac-
tivities (i.e. soliciting Washington residents for international cruises by
Florida agents) to the cause of action. 57 This author believes jurisdic-
tion should be upheld. But whatever the ruling, the case will be of
significance.
Conley v. Boyle Drug Co.,58 decided shortly after White, also in-
volved construction and application of the Florida long-arm statutes.
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that cross-petition motions to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction should have been granted because the
plaintiff failed to offer any counter-affidavits or other evidentiary proof
of their allegations in response to the defendants' affidavits opposing
jurisdiction.59 The court also held against retroactive use of amend-
ments to the long-arm statutes: "The prohibition against retroactive ap-
plication applies in connection with both aspects of the long-arm stat-
ute at issue." 60
A correct and clear illustration of the principle that obligations for
payment pursuant to a contract made outside the State of Florida, for
services to be performed outside the state, do not vest jurisdiction in
Florida simply because the payee subsequently moved to Florida, is
found in Cookbook Publishers Inc. v. American Dental Program.6 1
Cookbook Publishers recognized that jurisdiction over the payer of an
obligation is not carried on the back of the payer and simply does not
54. Id. at 253.
55. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S.Ct. 39 (1990).
56. Shute v. Carnival Cruse Lines, 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S.
Ct. 39 (1990).
57. Id.
58. 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990).
59. Id. at 288-89.
60. Id. at 288.
61. 559 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
1002 [Vol. 15
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exist in any new forum in which the payee chooses to relocate.12 How-
ever, a different situation arises when the parties have contracted for
payment within Florida. Such a situation would involve consideration
of the totality of the transaction with a due process analysis of
reasonableness .6 3
C. Waiver by Appearance of Plaintiff or Defendant / Collateral
Attack / Child Support and Custody
Ever since the decision by the United States Supreme Court in
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 4 it has been established
that a party who has appeared is bound by that court's jurisdictional
ruling and may not collaterally attack the decree for lack of jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, if a party appears and does not raise the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person, it has been deemed to be waived. 5
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in York v. Texas6 upheld a
state's right to make every appearance a general appearance and thus
bar the use of a special appearance to challenge jurisdiction. But where
a party has not appeared and final judgment based upon default is ob-
tained, it has been established since the days of Pennoyer v. Neffi7 that
a collateral attack may be made. These principles were recognized in
Riskin v. Miklos, 8 which held a "defensive jurisdictional motion filed
by an attorney who was not admitted to the Ohio bar and which, for
that reason, was - quite correctly - stricken by the Ohio court" did not
constitute an appearance.6 9 Subsequently, the court ordered the trial
court on remand to hear the jurisdictional attack.7
In Edwards v. Johnson,7 1 the question was whether an out-of-state
plaintiff, by voluntarily appearing and invoking the jurisdiction of a
Florida court, is submitted to the jurisdiction of such court over per-
missive counter-claims authorized by Rule 1.170. The court opined:
62. Id.
63. See id. at 1303.
64. 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
65. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140.
66. 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
67. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
68. 569 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
69. Id. at 941.
70. Id.
71. 569 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
1991] 1003
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The general rule with regard to personal jurisdiction is that a
plaintiff who initiates an action in Florida court subjects himself to
the jurisdiction of that court, and to such lawful orders which are
thereafter entered, only with respect to the subject matter of the
action. 72
The Third District Court of Appeal opinion in Burden v. Dickman,
although cited by the First District as authority, does not support the
Edwards opinion. In Burden, jurisdiction was upheld over the plaintiff
because "[b]y petitioning the probate court to be appointed joint
guardians of the property, the Burdens submitted themselves to the
court's jurisdiction. They cannot now be heard to allege lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction.""3
None of the cases cited held that a permissive counterclaim cre-
ates an exception to the general rule. In Frazier v. Frazier,"' which was
also cited in Edwards, Florida was simply not the proper forum to
modify the parties' foreign dissolution decree.
With due deference, this rule that a foreign plaintiff i; not subject
to a permissive counterclaim appears, at first glance, to have little
merit and substance. Upon further analysis, the rule makes even less
sense. If a Florida plaintiff files suit in Florida, that Florida plaintiff is
certainly subject to jurisdiction of any and all counterclaims, permis-
sive or compulsory. The Rules do not require, or even provide, for the
issuance of a summons for service of an answer (a counterclaim is not a
separate pleading, it is to be included in the answer) 75 upon the plain-
tiff. It is to be served (without a summons) on the plaintiff's attorney
(or plaintiff if pro se) as provided in Rule 1.080.76
Contrary to the First District's reasoning, there is no statutory
provision in Chapter 48 of the Florida Statutes, or elsewhere, that re-
quires the defendant to obtain service by summons over the plaintiff.
What possible rationale could exist for judicially creating an immunity
in favor of a foreign plaintiff who chooses to voluntarily invoke the
Florida's judicial system to assert a claim against a Florida citizen? Is
the quality of Florida justice so low and inferior that in good con-
science we should protect foreign plaintiffs from the evils o f the Florida
72. Id. at 474 (citing Burden v. Dickman, 547 So. 2d 170, 172 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1989)).
73. Burden, 547 So. 2d at 172.
74. 442 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
75. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170.
76. See generally FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.080.
[Vol. 151004
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judicial system? Surely Florida's jurisprudence recognizes that the
achievements of its legal system are at least as good as, if not better
than, those of its sister states. Perhaps the reason for the Rule is that,
if the foreign plaintiff had not filed suit in Florida, the Florida defend-
ant would have had to invoke the aid of a foreign forum to obtain re-
lief. With deference, the refusal to exercise jurisdiction should not be
predicated on what the foreign party plaintiff did not do, but on what
the party did do - which was to file suit in Florida and invoke the oper-
ation of the Florida judicial system. There is neither a constitutional
prohibition - state or federal - nor any Florida Supreme Court case,
that would mandate that jurisdiction over a plaintiff be limited to the
claim contained in the complaint.
Florida specifically has provided for jurisdiction over a spouse re-
siding in Florida pursuing an action for alimony or child support.78
This provision does, however, continue to raise questions as to its
proper meaning.
In Durand v. Durand,9 the husband contended that the provisions
of the statute did not apply because he did not reside in Florida "im-
mediately" prior to filing of the action. The court recognized that the
residency should "'proximately proceed the commencement of the ac-
tion'" but upheld jurisdiction notwithstanding the passage of several
years, upon the "'totality of the circumstances.' "80 In Dunlop v.
Dunlop,"' the parties had been married in New York and divorced in
London some 14 years later. After the divorce, the wife moved to Flor-
ida and the husband made support payments. The court held jurisdic-
tion did not exist in reference to her suit to domesticate a foreign judg-
ment and to increase child support.82
In Alvarez v. Alvarez, 3 following a Florida divorce and the grant-
ing of custody to the mother, the father kidnapped the child from Flor-
ida and concealed the child in New York for six years. After the
mother regained custody in Florida, the father, nevertheless, was al-lowed limited visitation. 5 After the mother, now remarried, had moved
77. See generally White, 568 So. 2d 886.
78. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(e) (1989).
79. 569 So. 2d 838, 839 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
80. Id. at 839 (citations omitted).
81. 564 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
82. Id. at 619.
83. 566 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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to New Jersey with her child, the husband brought the child to Florida
and, believe it or not, obtained an emergency change of custody at a
7:15 a.m. hearing based upon a telephonic notice to the mother in New
Jersey.86 The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed on the basis
that Florida should decline to exercise jurisdiction in favor of New
Jersey pursuant to section 61.1316(3) of Florida's Statutes.87
IV. VENUE
Unlike the significant statutory changes in the subject matter ju-
risdiction of the Florida circuit and county courts, and a number of
significant cases concerning jurisdiction over the person, the venue
cases were mainly representative of typical problems. Nevertheless,
there are several matters worth noting.
Among the recurring issues is the standard of review. In Hickman
v. Sacino,88 the court stated that the standard for review for granting
or refusing a change of venue under forum nonconveniens is "'palpa-
ble' abuse or a grossly 'improvident' exercise of discretion." 89 In Carter
v. Fleming,9" the complaint alleged that a promissory note was due and
payable (to the holder after default) in Escambia County. The appel-
late court found an abuse of discretion:
Because the promissory note designated Duval County as the place
of payment and the complaint contains no allegation of fact that
86. Id.
87. The statute provides in pertinent part:
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if
it is in the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For
this purpose if may take into account the following factors, among others:
(a) If another state is or recently was the child's home state;
(b) If another state has a closer connection with the child and his family
or with the child and one or more of the contestants;
(c) If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available in
another state;
(d) If the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropri-
ate; and
(e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene
any of the purposes stated in s. 61.1304.
FLA. STAT. § 61.1316(3) (1989).
88. 566 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(per curiam).
89. Id. at 903 (citation omitted).
90. 567 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
1006 [Vol. 15
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 4
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/4
VanDercreek
prior to Carter's breach for nonpayment a holder in due course of
the note designated another place of payment, the cause of action
alleged in count two could only have accrued in Duval County.
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that proper
venue for count two lies in Escambia County. 91
Several appeals involved related 'law suits pending in different
counties. In Independent Fire Insurance Co. v. Arvidson,92 an insurer
had previously filed a suit for a declaratory judgment against the in-
sured to void a policy allegedly procured by misrepresentation. The
present suit was brought by the insured against the tortfeasor and the
insurance company for PIP and uninsured/underinsured benefits. No
abuse of discretion was found in the trial court's refusal to transfer the
personal injury action; however, the district court ordered the trial ac-
tion stayed pending the declaratory judgment suit.93
Several cases accomplished a consolidation by transferring. In
Towers Construction Co. v. Key West Polo Club Apartments, Ltd.,
94
while a contractor's suit to foreclose on a mechanic's lien was pending
in Monroe County, a subsequent suit alleging fraud and other matters
was filed in Bay County and transferred by stipulation to Monroe
County. The defendant in those proceedings then filed an unjust enrich-
ment action in Orange County based upon a mistake in making pay-
ments. The court ordered the Orange County suit transferred:
[W]here there are two actions between the same parties pending in
different circuits, jurisdiction is in the circuit where service of pro-
cess was first perfected. Where the suits revolve around the same
set of facts, the claims are interrelated and one lawsuit can resolve
the issues, it is judicially prudent to permit both suits to be resolved
in the same forum. 5
Similarly, in Edward J. Gerritts Inc. v. Chambers Truss Inc.,9 6 the
court stated: "In the interest of justice, venue should be transferred
where it will avoid piecemeal litigation and the possibility of inconsis-
tent results. In addition, a change of venue is intended to prevent a
91. Id. at 536-37.
92. 564 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. i990).
93. Id. at 1255.
94. 569 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
95. Id. at 831 (citations omitted).
96. 564 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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miscarriage of justice in the correct venue or to afford a more conven-
ient venue." 97
The interpretation of "or other representative" contained in the
venue statute section 47.051 was at issue in Piper Aircraft Corp. v.
Schwendemann.98 The statute, which is of substantial importance be-
cause it governs venue over foreign corporations, states in full:
Actions against corporations. -Actions against domestic corpora-
tions shall be brought only in the county or district where such
corporation has, or usually keeps an office for transaction of its cus-
tomary business, where the cause of action accrued, or where the
property in litigation is located. Actions against foreign corpora-
tions doing business in this state shall be brought in a county where
such corporation has an agent or other representative, where the
cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is
located. 9
The Third District Court of Appeal held that Piper Aircraft had repre-
sentatives in Dade County on the basis of having two independent and
separate entities there that were "contractually authorized by Piper to
perform repair, warranty, and maintenance work."' 00
The rule that a specific venue statute governs an action when a
general venue provision is also available was cited in Bryant v. Bry-
ant.'' The court held, in a suit to enforce alimony and child support
resulting from a Dade County judgment, that venue properly lay in
Orange County, the location where the mother and child were now
residing. 102
Spector v. Old Town Key West Development Ltd.,' 3 recognized
the general rule that a "local action" construction requires transfer of
an action to the county where the land at issue is located. The court
held, however, that a claim for the appointment of a liquidating trustee
for the assets of a limited partnership - assets which included real
property - was a transitory rather than a local action.'
97. Id. at 625.
98. 564 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
99. FLA. STAT. § 47.051 (1989).
100. 564 So. 2d at 547.
101. 566 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
102. Id. at 68.
103. 567 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
104. Id. at 1018.
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Posey v. Sheldon05 involved the question of which party should
pay fees upon the transfer of an action. The Orange County Circuit
Court ordered plaintiff's suit on a note executed in Okaloosa County
transferred for improper venue, but nonetheless directed the defendant
to pay the transfer fees. The district court reversed the ruling on fees
under section 47.091 of the Florida Statutes which requires the party
initially filing the action to pay the fees where the action was filed ini-
tially in the improper forum. Apparently, the trial court had confused a
transfer under Rule 1.170(j), where a defendant's counterclaim or
cross-claim exceeds the jurisdiction of county court and where the de-
fendant pays the fees, with a transfer under Rule 1.060, which provides
for transfer when the court in which the plaintiff filed suit lacks subject
matter jurisdiction or venue. The Fifth District was clearly correct in
holding that the plaintiff who has filed in the wrong venue must pay the
transfer costs, not only because of section 47.09116 of the Florida Stat-
utes, but also because of Rule 1.060(c) which states:
Method. The service charge of the clerk of the court to which an
action is transferred under this rule shall be paid by the party who
commenced the action within 30 days from the date the order of
transfer is entered, subject to taxation as provided by law when the
action is determined. If the -service charge is not paid within the 30
days, the action shall be dismissed without prejudice by the court
that entered the order of transfer. 107
What is strange, is why would the defendant want the suit trans-
ferred instead of dismissed for improper venue? Ordinarily the defend-
ant moves to dismiss for lack of venue, and the plaintiff will request
transfer rather than refiling a new action in the proper county (which
should be done, of course, before the statute of limitations runs).
One final note concerning transfers under Rule 1.060 and 1.1700)
is that although Rule 1.060(a) and (b) specify that the transfer is to be
"by the same method as provided in Rule 1.170(j),"108 section (c) of
Rule 1.060 mandates a different method. Not only must the defendant
tender the transfer fee under Rule 1.170(j), the defendant must do so
at the time the counterclaim is filed (unless the court in its discretion
105. 560 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
106. FLA. STAT. § 47.091 (1989)
107. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.060(c).
108. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.060(a) and (b).
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extends the time). 109 Under Rule 1.1700), if the fee is paid, "the action
shall be transferred forthwith." 110 In contrast, under Rule 1.060(c) the
plaintiff is to pay the fee within 30 days after the case is o:-dered trans-
ferred, which transfer the court "may" order instead. of "shall"
order."'
V. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
Concepts of equity and justice are predicated on the policy of un-
biased judges making impartial judicial decisions. In the common
mind, judges are expected to be above reproach, totally objective, and
Solomon-like as they distribute justice to the masses.
Unfortunately, most judges are merely human, notwithstanding
our desires that they be otherwise. When the question of a "fair trial"
or "conflict of interest" arises, two mechanisms come into play: Article
V of the Florida Constitution, through the Judicial Qualifications Com-
mission, regulating the grounds for admonishment or continuance in
office; and recusal, either initiated by the judge himself, by suggestion,
or by motion by one of the parties involved who might be threatened by
the judge's potential for bias. Disqualification is a sensitive area for
judges regardless of what mechanism is utilized.
While the Judicial Administration Rule 2.060 requires a lawyer to
disregard the unfounded request of a client for disqualification of a
judge, a more difficult decision must be made when the client's fears
appear to be valid. Unfortunately, parties are able to abuse the system
and eliminate, under the guise of bias, a competent, intelligent, and
unbiased judge in the hope and expectation of obtaining a successor
judge who would be friendly to the movant. Undoubtedly, this has hap-
pened and will continue to happen, but there is no effective way of
precluding this possible evil because it appears essential that a chal-
lenged judge not conduct a hearing to refute ill-founded allegations.
The lawyer must weigh his professional and ethical responsibilities to
represent his client's best interests against personal concerns about of-
fending the judge and living with the possible ramifications in future
cases. Following an unsuccessful motion, a lawyer may find there is
some truth in the old adage that if one is going to shoot at the king, it
is better not to merely wound him. Additionally, the replacement may
109. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.060(c).
110. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(j).
111. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.060(c).
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cause the original judge to look more attractive in retrospect.
Proper procedures for disqualification of judges are discussed in
the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3-C, and are based on
Rule 1.432112 and chapter 38 of the Florida Statutes. If a legally suffi-
cient motion is filed, the judge must proceed to enter an order of dis-
qualification and may take no further actions on the case."' "[L]egal
sufficiency" is met by technical compliance with the statutory and Rule
requirements as well as a determination of whether the allegations
would cause "a reasonably prudent person" to fear an unfair or biased
hearing before the judge in question." 4 While technical noncompliance
has not barred valid claims in the past,115 not all courts are tolerant of
motions which do not meet section 38.10 guidelines requiring the inclu-
sion of an affidavit of prejudice." 6
Motions must be made within a "reasonable time" following the
discovery of valid grounds for disqualification. 11 Timely filing allevi-
ates unnecessary costs, delay, and adverse effects on the other
parties.""
"[A]n allegation in a motion that a litigant or counsel for a liti-
gant has made a legal campaign contribution to the political campaign
of the trial judge, or the trial judge's spouse, without more, is not a
legally sufficient ground [for disqualification]." ''  In MacKenzie v.
Super Kids Bargain Store,"z0 two suits were consolidated' 2' around a
112. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.432.
113. Mackenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1990);
Thunderbird Ltd., v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 566 So. 2d. 1296 (Fla 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
114. Thunderbird, 566 So. 2d. at 1304 (citation omitted).
115. Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (failure to
comply with statutory requirements by attaching a certificate of good faith to the mo-
tion to disqualify, did not require that movant's motion to disqualify be denied).
116. Lee v. Lee, 563 So. 2d 754, 755 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(per curiam).
117. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.432(c).
118. Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 1986).
119. MacKenzie, 565 So. 2d at 1335 (footnote omitted).
120. 565 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1990).
121. Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990),
was consolidated with Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc. v. MacKenzie for the purpose of
en banc consideration at the appellate level. In Breakstone, at the trial court level, the
defendant's motion was denied by MacKenzie. A renewed motion was also denied. In
Super Kids, after the defendant moved for disqualification on the basis of the same
$500 campaign contribution, plaintiff's counsel's ore tenus motion for substitution of
counsel was granted, but the motion for disqualification was denied.
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common allegation of bias due to a $500 campaign contribution given
by the plaintiff's counsel to the trial judge's husband. The Florida Su-
preme Court determined that, although there are valid concerns with
campaign contributions under the judicial election system,'22 such con-
tributions are an unavoidable part of the election process. The court
then found "that Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct together with..
statutory limitations[s] upon campaign contributions and the requisite
public disclosure of such contributions, provided adequate safeguards"
and a per se rule of disqualification because of campaign contributions
was not necessary.' 23 The court then held that when a campaign contri-
bution is the sole grounds for a judge's suggested recusal, it will be
considered legally insufficient for disqualification purposes. Addition-
ally, the court confirmed that judges are not to go "beyond a mere
determination of the legal sufficiency of the motion" and should not
attempt to defend or refute the allegations of impartiality. 24
When more than one disqualification is requested by any party to
a suit, "a subsequent disqualification under section 38.02 shall be
treated in the same manner as an initial disqualification under that
statute."'12 5 An important distinction exists between a disqualification
under section 38.02 and a disqualification under section 38.10. While
subsequent disqualifications by the same party under section 38.02 are
treated "in the same manner," a party, under section 38.10, has only
one unfettered right" for a judge's disqualification so that the same
party's subsequent motion for a disqualification under section 38.10 is
governed by the stricter standard stated in the second portion of that
statute.
26
122. MacKenzie, 565 So. 2d at 1335, 1340. Justice Kogan notes how easily the
Rules could be abused if the district court of appeal ruling had been affirmed, allowing
a $500 contribution to be legally sufficient for disqualification. "Attorney's who wished
to steer their cases away from a particular judge need do not more than contribute a
large sum to that judge's campaign .... [T]hese attorneys in actuality would be buy-
ing insurance that the judge could never hear their cases." Id. at 1.340 (Kogan J.,
concurring specially).
123. Id. at 1336.
124. Id. at 1339 (quoting Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla.
1978)("[W]hen a judge has looked beyond the mere legal sufficiency of a suggestion of
prejudice and attempted to refute the charges of partiality, he has then exceeded the
proper scope of his inquiry and on that basis alone established grounds for his disquali-
fication." (emphasis omitted)).
125. Brown v. St. George Island, Ltd., 561 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. 1990).
126. Id. at 256.
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In Brown v. St. George Island, Ltd., 27 the original trial judge was
recused under section 38.02 and the succeeding judge had been dis-
qualified under section 38.10. The Florida Supreme Court agreed that
a negative statement by a trial judge causes a party to feel that the
judge is biased against him, and it is reasonable for such a litigant to
fear they would not receive a fair trial under that judge.1 28 One month
later, the supreme court revisited Brown and held that when an oppos-
ing party to a suit moves under section 38.10 to disqualify a judge, the
motion is regarded as an initial motion for that party even if it is a
second or third disqualification within the same suit.1 29 The court noted
that a second request by a party who had previously sought a disquali-
fication is subjected to a stricter standard under section 38.10, but
when a second disqualification is sought by a party who has not previ-
ously filed such a motion, then "each side has the right to seek the
disqualification of one judge under the standard enumerated in the first
portion of section 38.10. ' '13o
VI. PLEADINGS
Florida has adopted liberal rules on pleading, and forms of action
and technical forms for pleas have been abolished.13' In Mayedo v. Co-
lite Industries, Inc.,132 the court reversed the trial court's ruling be-
cause the "judgment represents an aggravated and obviously unaccept-
able case of . . . reliance upon a meaningless technicality." Leave of
the court to amend pleadings "shall be given freely whern justice so
requires."'31 3 However, despite liberal rules for pleadings, problems
have arisen on appeal. Generally, recent cases reflect a trend to allow
amendment as required. In Salamon v. Munuswamy, M.D., P.A.,""
the court ruled that although an amended complaint had been filed
exclusively for declaratory relief, the court would allow supplementary
127. Id. at 254.
128. Id. at 257.
129. Brown v. St. George Island, Ltd., 562 So. 2d at 684, 685 (Fla. 1990).
130. Id. at 685. The court stated that "[i]t would be illogical to assume that the
legislature intended for the party that first disqualifies a judge under section 38.10 to
have that motion measured by a less stringent standard than a later motion filed by an
opposing party seeking to remove a successor judge." Id.
131. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110.
132. 566 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
133. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.90 (a).
134. 566 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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relief and an amendment that included injunctive relief as well. a35 In
Johnson Engineering, Inc. v. Pate,"6 the appellate court allowed
amendment after the trial court had denied a demand for jury trial as
untimely. 137 The appellate court ruled that although the case had al-
ready been noticed for a nonjury trial, raising of new issues which are
triable by a jury, embodied by an amended answer, warrant granting of
such a jury trial.'38 In Estate of Bobinger v. Deltona Corp.,3 9 the court
overturned a trial court's dismissal with prejudice of a class. action suit,
stating that the appellants should have been allowed an opportunity to
amend their complaint. 140 In this particular case, the trial court had
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.' 4 ' The appellate court
upheld the dismissal, and only took issue with the lower court's disal-
lowance of leave to amend the complaint. 4 '
However, blanket leave to amend is not guaranteed. At a mini-
mum, "[f]undamental concepts of due process require a party seeking
modification of a prior court order to file a written pleading and pro-
vide appropriate notice to all parties concerned."'143 Furthermore, ap-
pellate courts appear disinclined to review cases where the appellant
has not sought leave of the trial court to amend before pressing an
appeal. In Perruzzi v. Ferretti,4 4 the court held that an appellant who
did not seek leave of the trial court to amend his complaint cannot
complain that he should have been granted leave to amend. 45 The ap-
pellate court dismissed the appeal because "[t]o bring this claimed
right to amend to the appellate court before giving the trial court the
opportunity to consider such [an] assertion is untimely.' 46 Clearly,
there are some limits regarding the court's patience when it comes to
allowing amendments to complaints. In Feigin v. Hospital Staffing Ser-
135. Id. at 900.
136. 563 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
137. Id. at 1123.
138. Id.
139. 563 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
140. Id. at 740.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Herman v. Herman, 565 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (empha-
sis omitted).
144. 564 So. 2d 621, 622 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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vices, Inc.,'147 the appellate court supported the trial court's refusal to
grant leave to amend, saying that "[r]efusal to grant leave to amend
was not an abuse of discretion since this was the seventh complaint
filed over a four-year period and the record clearly reflects the court's
warning that this was the plaintiff's 'last bite at the apple.' "1148
Courts have also focused on whether leave to amend, particularly
at the trial stage, would unfairly prejudice other parties. For example,
in Saunders v. Goulard,49 the court noted that the appellants were:
[D]eprived of any and all discovery as to the 'other extras' discov-
ered at the eleventh hour by the plaintiff, and, additionally, the
absence of information in regard to this additional claim prior to
trial impacted upon the formulation of the defendants' offer of
judgement and the subsequent post-trial determination by the trial
court as to the 'prevailing party' for the purposes of assessment of
costs and fees. 150
The appellate court then reversed and remanded for entry of judgment
exclusive of the additional items allowed by the trial court.' 5'
Similarly, within limits, courts have been liberal in determining
that improper pleadings should be recast properly without penalty. For
example, in In re Forfeiture,5 2 the court stated that "[w] e believe that
respondents' Motion to Determine Damages should be treated as a
counterclaim by supplemental pleading under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.170(e)."' 53 Likewise, in Yost v. American Nat'l Bank, 54
the court determined that the trial court's severance of a counterclaim
was improper, since it should have been treated as a compulsory coun-
terclaim, even if it was not cast in that mold originally. 55 However, the
court in Turkey Creek, Inc. v. Londono, 56 noted that when there are
substantial differences in issues between the claim and counterclaim,
the fact that there is a logical relationship is not enough to allow re-
147. 569 So. 2d 941, 942 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 942.
149. 569 So. 2d 1305, 1307 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
150. Id. at 1306.
151. Id.
152. 569 So. 2d 1274, 1277 (Fla. 1990) (footnote omitted).
153. Id. at 1277.
154. 570 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
155. Id. at 352.
156. 567 So. 2d 943, 946 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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casting as a compulsory counterclaim.' Thus, as in amending plead-
ings, the record is mixed, but the trend appears to be in favor of liberal
application of the Rules.
VII. DISCOVERY
A. In General
Liberal "notice pleading" in Florida requires that some form of
discovery be used in almost every case. Florida's broad discovery provi-
sions reflect a policy of trial on the merits instead of trial by ambush.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280 provides the general framework
for discovery in Florida. Rule 1.280(b)(1) allows discovery of "any mat-
ter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of the pending
action . ',158 Rule 1.280 also provides the various methods for com-
plying with discovery under the general rule. These methods of discov-
ery include: oral or written depositions (Rules 1.310, 1.320); interroga-
tories (Rule 1.340); production of documents and things and entry
upon land for inspection and other purposes (Rules 1.350, 1.351); phys-
ical and mental examinations (Rule 1.370); and requests for admissions
(Rule 1.370).
Information is discoverable if it is "reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery" of evidence admissible at trial." 9 The courts have
supported the broad use of discovery, even at the pre-suit stage. For
example, in Adventist Health System v. Hegwood,160 an en banc panel
of the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of
an equitable "pure bill of discovery" - allowing depositions of wit-
nesses - even though the applicable medical malpractice statute
granted only limited and informal presuit discovery and would have
prevented the depositions.' 6 '
There are, however, some limits on the use of discovery. While the
Rule provides broad authority to delve into "relevant" matters, discov-
ery may not be used for harassment purposes.' 62 Thus, in FDIC v.
Balkany, the appellate court invalidated an expansive discovery order
157. Id. at 945.
158. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1).
159. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1).
160. 569 So. 2d 1295, 1297 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(en banc).
161. Id. at 1296.
162. See Caribbean Security Systems Inc. v. Security Control Systems Inc., 486
So. 2d 654 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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that allowed a party access to transactions contained in bank records
not even remotely related to the requestor's business.163 The court held
that the defendant's hope of finding some reference to misplaced docu-
ments did not justify an order that amounted to a "fishing expedi-
tion. '164 The principal discovery tool is the deposition. The discovery
rules have kept pace with technology concerning the manner in which
this discovery tool may be used so that oral depositions may now be
conducted via telephone" 5 or videotape, 6 provided that the proper
procedures, outlined in the Rule, 67 are followed.
In an oral deposition under Rule 1.310, section (d) provides the
proper manner for suspending or terminating the deposition and failure
to comply with the Rule may result in a waiver of any objections to
questions asked at the deposition. This point was illustrated in DeGen-
naro v. Janie Dean Chevrolet, Inc.,6 8 where the appellate court held
that, although counsel objected to a limited waiver of his client's attor-
ney-client privilege, proceeding with the deposition waived the privilege
and the court could not "unring the bell."' 69 When an objection has
been raised to a question asked during a deposition, the proper proce-
dure under Rule 1.310(d) is to suspend the deposition pending a ruling
on the objectionable question. It is improper for a lawyer to instruct a
witness not to answer a question and then continue with the deposition.
In Smith v. Grady, 70 the court stated that such an improper proce-
dure, through "selective adherence to the rules of civil procedure,"
amounts to "arrogance of the defense attorney" and "is without legal
justification.'' Similarly, where a request for a continuation is not
made at a summary judgment hearing, a party cannot later claim that
they did not have enough time to complete discovery.' 2
The 1988 Amendments to Florida's discovery rules clarified the
scope of discovery. The existence and content of insurance and indem-
nity agreements are now discoverable. 3 Additionally, expert witnesses
163. 564 So. 2d 580, 581 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
164. Id.
165. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(7).
166. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310 (b)(4).
167. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(7); FLA R. Civ. P. 1.30(b)(4).
168. 568 So. 2d 1008, 1009 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
169. Id. at 1009.
170. 569 So. 2d 504, 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
171. Id. at 507.
172. Light v. Weldarc Co., Inc., 569 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
173. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2) (indemnity agreements are discoverable but not
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"expected to be called" at trial may now be deposed without leave of
the court.' 74 However, in Edwards v. Humana, Inc.,175 the court recog-
nized that "it is clear that the intent of rule 1.280 (b)(4)(B) is to afford
protection from the discovery of a consulting expert.' 7  The court's
holding in Edwards is consistent with the language of the Rule that
protects a consulting expert except under "exceptional circumstances."
Interrogatories were also addressed under the 1988 Amendments
to the Rule. A party may now serve up to 30 interrogatories on another
party without leave of the court. 77 Further, if the Florida Supreme
Court has approved a standard form 78 for initial interrogatories, then
that form must be used. 79 Examination of persons was also broadened
under the 1988 amendments to the Rules. An examination of a person,
as to matters in controversy, may now be performed by experts other
than physicians.'
B. Work Product/Attorney-Client Privilege
The work product privilege' 8 ' protects materials "prepared in an-
ticipation of litigation" by allowing discovery of materials only upon a
requestor's showing of "need" and inability, "without undue hardship
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means."' 82 The courts have limited the reach of this "privilege"
through the construction of the term "substantial equivalent." Illustra-
tive of this concept is Florida Mining and Materials Corp. v. Continen-
tal Casualty Co., 83 where the court protected a party's internal memo-
randa by finding that "admissions provide[d] the 'substantial
admissible at trial).
174. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(4)(A).
175. 569 So. 2d 1315, 1316 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
176. Id. at 1316.
177. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.340(a).
178. There are currently three standard interrogatory forms: Automobile Negli-
gence-Interrogatories to Plaintiff; Automobile Negligence-Interrogatories to Defendant;
and Marriage Dissolution-Interrogatories to Party. See FLA. R. Civ. P. Appendix.
179. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.340(a).
180. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.360(a).
181. Technically speaking, work product is not an evidentiary privilege, instead,
it is an exception to disclosure created by the Rules of Civil Procedure rather than the
Rules of Evidence.
182. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(3).
183. 556 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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equivalent' of the internal memoranda.""" While materials, or fact
work product, are discoverable upon a showing of need and the lack of
a substantial equivalent, opinion work product is "absolutely, or nearly
absolutely, privileged." '185 In appropriate cases, the work product pro-
tection may apply to the investigative materials prepared on behalf of a
nonparty. For example, in Zaban v. McCombs,'86 corporate officers and
directors were named as defendants in a work-related wrongful death
action, but the corporation was not named as a party. The corporation
had, however, hired an investigator and had prepared investigative
materials concerning the accident and the plaintiff, claiming that the
materials were not protected because of the corporation's nonparty sta-
tus, requested discovery of the materials. The appellate court held that
the plaintiff, in such a situation, could not circumvent the work product
protection of Rule 1.280 (b)(3) merely because the producer of the
work product was not named as a party.187
Under the attorney-client privilege, a recognized evidentiary privi-
lege, undisclosed communications between an attorney and a client are
protected from involuntary disclosure even when the communications
"arise in the course of a transaction which itself later becomes the sub-
ject of litigation."188 An in-camera examination of requested material
is proper in order to determine if privileged information is protected by
the attorney-client privilege.'89 Waiver of the attorney-client privilege
may result from disclosure of the information. 90
The courts have not been receptive towards attempts at 'circum-
venting an evidentiary privilege. In Paper Corp. v. Schneider,' the
defendant, in a post-judgment execution proceeding, tried to shield fi-
nancial records from disclosure by turning them over to his accountant
and then seeking protection under the accountant-client privilege.'9 2
184. Id. at 519.
185. State v. Rabin, 495 So. 2d 257, 262 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986); see also
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(3) ("The court shall protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representa-
tive of a party concerning the litigation.").
186. 568 So. 2d 87, 89 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
187. Id. at 89.
188. Florida Mining and Materials Corp., 556 So. 2d at 519.
189. Blank v. Mukamal, 566 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (certiorari
granted and trial court's order demanding production of counsel's entire files quashed).
190. Id. at 55.
191. 563 So. 2d 1134, 1135 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
192. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.5055, 473.316 (1989).
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However, the court refused to accept the defendant's claim of eviden-
tiary privilege and held that the defendant could not shield otherwise
discoverable material by shifting that material into the possession of a
person granted a statutory privilege.'
C. Sanctions
Rule 1.380 provides sanctions for a party's failure to comply with
a discovery order. A trial court has the discretion to order dismissal' 94
or default9 5 for failure to comply with discovery requirements and a
dismissal or default entered by the trial court will be reviewed under an
"abuse of discretion" standard. 196 The Florida Supreme Court recently
addressed what factual findings are necessary before the trial court
may enter a default or dismissal under Rule 1.380. In Commonwealth
Federal Savings and Loan v. Tubero, 97 the Florida Supreme Court
considered the following certified question:
IS AN EXPRESS WRITTEN FINDING OF WILLFUL OR
DELIBERATE REFUSAL TO OBEY A COURT ORDER TO
COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY UNDER FLORIDA RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 1.380 NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN THE
SEVERE SANCTIONS OF DISMISSAL OR DEFAULT
AGAINST A NONCOMPLYING PLAINTIFF OR
DEFENDANT. 198
The court answered the question in the affirmative, and, though reaf-
firming the trial judge's discretionary power to enter a default or dis-
missal for noncompliance with discovery requirements, required that an
order of dismissal or default "contain an explicit finding of willful
noncompliance."199
An order of dismissal or default is the exception rather than the
general rule and thus, as the court noted in Yanks v. Amerifirst
193. Schneider, 563 So. 2d at 1135.
194. Delta Information Serv., Inc. v. Jannach, 569 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
195. Commonwealth Federal Saving and Loan v. Tubero, 569 So. 2d 1271 (Fla.
1990).
196. Id. at 1273.
197. Id. at 1271.
198. Tubero v. Chapnich, 552 So. 2d 932, 936 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
199. Tubero, 569 So. 2d at 1273.
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Bank,20 0 "the severity of the sanction [for noncompliance with a discov-
ery order] must be commensurate with the violation."' 20 1 The range of
appropriate sanctions include: prohibiting the introduction of evi-
dence;202 refusing to allow a party to present a claim or defense;203 or
the awarding of fees and costs.204 The court's contempt power may also
be used to remedy an individual's noncompliance with discovery re-
quirements. In Anderson Inv. Co. v. Lynch, the court noted that a de-
ponent may be found in contempt of court if he fails to be sworn or to
answer questions after being directed to do so by the court.20 5
VIII. DEFAULT
The terms "default" and "judgment" are not synonyms. "De-
fault," as used in the Rules, refers to an entry or order of default by
the clerk or judge. "Judgment," as used in the Rules, refers to the final
disposition of the proceeding, rendered by the judge, following the en-
try of a default. The term "default judgment," when it is used in court
opinions or legal literature, usually refers to a final judgment that was
rendered as a result of default. Occasionally the term "default judg-
ment" is used to incorrectly denote an entry of default, requiring that
the context in which the term is used be examined in order to ascertain
what the writer intended through the use of the term.
Rule 1.500 addresses the entry of default, the entry of judgments
upon the default, and the setting aside of defaults. 20 6 Rule 1.500 is
distinct from Rule 1.380(b); the later provision allows a judgment by
default for a party's failure to comply with discovery while Rule 1.500
addresses a party's failure to plead.207 In addition to a default for fail-
ure to plead, a default may also be entered for: filing a sham plead-
ing;208 failure to comply with a discovery order;20 9 failure of a party to
appear for his deposition or to answer properly propounded interrogato-
200. 569 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
201. Id.
202. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)(2)(B).
203. Id.
204. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Hammock, 489 So. 2d 761 (Fla. lst.Dist. Ct.
App. 1986).
205. 540 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
206. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500.
207. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500.
208. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.150(a).
209. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)(2)(C).
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ries; 210 or, failure to attend a pretrial conference."
The courts have liberally construed Rule 1.500, and are hesitant to
.uphold an entry of default that could deny a party the opportunity of a
decision on the merits of the case.212 In Apolaro v. Falcon,21 3 the court
held that a delay of 30-40 days in seeking relief from a default did not
justify denying the relief.2"4 The court stated that "[w]here there exists
any reasonable doubt in the matter, and where there has been no trial
on the merits, the trial court is to exercise its discretion in the direction
of vacating the default. 21 5
In Rapid Credit Corp. v. Sunset Park Centre,2 1 6 "Rapid" had er-
roneously filed a motion to transfer and consolidate in the wrong case.
Despite knowledge of these motions, opposing counsel sought, and was
granted, a clerk-entered default in the other case pending between the
parties. The appellate court remanded for vacation of the default and
held that opposing counsel, in this situation, was "on notice" that
Rapid intended to contest the action 217 and thus had an affirmative
duty to provide the court, and Rapid's counsel, with information re-
garding the procedural status of a case prior to default being
entered.18
Entry of an order of default can be avoided by filing a responsive
pleading prior to a motion for default. In Houswerth v. Sheriffs Dep't,
the court allowed dismissal for failure to prosecute, but held that a
default could not be entered in the action when a responsive pleading
was filed before the motion for default.219
If the trial court enters a default, until the entry has formed the
basis for a final judgment, the defaulted party can move to vacate or
set the order aside. A defendant is permitted, upon motion for relief
from a default judgment, to attack the "sufficiency -of the complaint
210. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(d).
211. FLA. R. Civ. P.. 1.200 (b).
212. Ole, Inc. v. Yariv, 566 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (default
judgment vacated and default set aside when defendant was unaware he was no longer
represented by counsel and plaintiff applied for ex parte default and obtained a default
judgment).
213. 566 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
214. Id. at 816.
215. Id. at 816.
216. 566 So. 2d 810, 811 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
217. Id. at 811.
218. Id.
219. 567 So. 2d 476 (Fla 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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and its allegations to support the judgment."220 A default may also be
set aside when, on the face of the pleadings, there is confusion over the
amount of time allowed for a response. 22
Under Rule 1.500, only the court may enter an order of default
when "any paper" has been filed by the opposing party. 2  The term
"any paper" has been construed liberally to allow a default entered
without notice to be vacated when a motion to consolidate and transfer
was erroneously filed in the wrong lawsuit 223 or when a motion to quash
service of process was filed. 224 After entry of a default, a party in de-
fault may only file a pleading requesting relief from the default.2 25
IX. DISMISSAL
Rule 1.420 provides for both voluntary and involuntary dismis-
sals.226 A party's failure to attend a pretrial conference may also result
in a dismissal of the action but Rule 1.200(c) governs the court's action
in that situation.227 Rule 1.420 allows for dismissal of claims with or
without prejudice.228
Because dismissal is such a drastic remedy, the courts have re-
quired evidence of "wilful or flagrant or persistent disobedience" of a
court order prior to allowing dismissal of an action.229 As noted by the
court in Epps v. Hartley, dismissal of a plaintiff's complaint suspends
the plaintiff's right to proceed but does not serve as an adjudication on
the merits.230 However, an order granting a motion to dismiss should
plainly indicate that the action has in fact been dismissed, and should
220. Cabral v. Diversified Serv., Inc., 560 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1990)(citations omitted) (abuse of discretion to enter default when failure to respond
was due to confusion resulting from the pendency of a case with a related subject
matter).
221. Hader v. American Builders and Contractors Co., 564 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(pleading that read "[t]he Defendants have __ number of
days" to respond was sufficient to demonstrate excusable neglect that justified setting
aside the default).
222. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(b).
223. Rapid Credit Corp., 566 So. 2d 810.
224. Carson v. Rossignol, 559 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
225. Hines v. Hines, 494 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
226. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420.
227. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200(c).
228. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.420.
229. Anthony v. Schmitt, 557 So. 2d 656, 662 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
230. 495 So. 2d 921, 922 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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contain the "requisite words of finality" in order to vest an appellate
court with jurisdiction to review the order."'
Much litigation arises regarding just what is meant by dismissal of
an action for "failure to prosecute." If "no record activity in further-
ance of the suit ' 2 32 has occurred for a period of one year, then dismis-
sal of the suit for failure to prosecute2 33 may be proper. In Anthony v.
Schmitt, the Second District Court of Appeal provided an in-depth
analysis of Rule 1.420(e).23 4 The court noted the conflict between the
First District 23 5 and the Fourth District23 and opted for an interpreta-
tion of Rule 1.420(e) that would allow the trial court more discretion
than the rule of the Fourth District, but less than that of the First
District. 37 The court stated that:
[A] trial court may dismiss an action if the only activity within the
relevant year is discovery activity by the plaintiff taken in bad faith
merely as a means to avoid the application of Rule 1.420(e) and
without any design 'to move the case forward toward a conclusion
on the merits or to hasten the suit to judgment.'238
The appellate court noted that its "bad faith activity" test was similar
to striking discovery that amounted to "sham or pretextual record ac-
tivity" when used by a plaintiff to circumvent Rule 1.420(e). s39
A motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute need not be filed by a
party to the action since the Rule itself grants standing to file the mo-
tion to "any interested person."240 Under the Rule, the one-year period
without record activity accrues from the date of filing the action, not
the date of service of notice in the proceeding.2 41 Rule 1.420(e) is not
231. Henrion v. New Era Realty IV, Inc. 567 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
232. Rosa v. Hodges, 559 So. 2d 1289, 1290 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
233. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e).
234. 557 So. 2d 656.
235. Karcher v. F.W. Schinz & Assoc., 487 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (trial court may determine whether discovery was "genuine" when deciding
whether such discovery constituted record activity under Rule 1.420(e)).
236. Philips v. Marshall Berwick Chevrolet, Inc. 467 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (dismissal is proper only when discovery is "repetitious").
237. Anthony, 557 So. 2d at 662.
238. Id. (quoting Barnett Bank v. Fleming, 508 So. 2d 718, 720 (Fla. 1987)).
239. Id.
240. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e); Rosa, 559 So. 2d at 1290.
241. Scharlin v. Broward County Property Appraisal Bd., 500 So. 2d 345 (Fla.
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self-executing, record activity prior to a party, or the court on its own
motion, moving for a dismissal for failure to prosecute will preclude
dismissal. 42
No consensus exists among the appellate courts regarding what
particular actions by the parties constitute record activity that is suffi-
cient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute: each case
turns on the specific facts before the court. Litigation concerning costs
and fees as to one defendant has been held to constitute record activity
precluding dismissal against co-defendants. 243 A notice of trial,244 a fil-
ing of summons, 245 service of process, 246 and paying a new filing fee in
order to transfer the case 241 have all been viewed as acts intended to
hasten a suit toward judgment and thus sufficient record activity to
preclude dismissal. Non-frivolous discovery activity may also constitute
record activity within the meaning of Rule 1.420(e). 48
On the other hand, the following actions have been viewed as non-
record activity, thus permitting dismissal for failure to prosecute: the
taking of depositions; 249 notices of withdrawal and substitution of coun-
sel;26 ° and responses to interrogatories filed after a motion to dismiss.251
In Caldwell v. Mantei, 52 the court held that status requests and re-
ports, even though technically record activity, did not further the case
toward disposition and were held insufficient to shield against a motion
to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
Upon a showing of "good cause", the court has the discretion to
allow an action to continue despite a party's failure to prosecute the
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
242. Barnes v. Escambia County Employees Credit Union, 488 So. 2d 879 (Fla.
Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
243. Freeman v. Schuele, 566 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
244. Mitchell v. Coker Fuel Inc., 511 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1987)(notice for trial controlled the action even though filed simultaneously with mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to prosecute).
245. Garland v. Southeastern Palm Beach County Hospital Taxing Dist., 526 So.
2d 725 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
246. Glassalum Eng'g Corp. v. 392208 Ontario Ltd., 487 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
247. Henkel v. Chua, 507 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
248. Anthony, 557 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
249. Smith v. DeLoach, 556 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
250. Nesbitt v. Community Health, Inc., 566 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
251. Caldwell v. Mantei, 544 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
252. Id. at 254.
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claim within one year.25 In A & W Electric, Inc. v. Abraira, the court
held that the plaintiffs heart surgery and subsequent rehabilitation pe-
riod were sufficient reasons to preclude dismissal, even though the
plaintiff did not seek a continuance prior to a one-year period of record
inactivity. 54 However, in Denson v.Meyer,255 the court refused to view
settlement negotiations between the parties as "good cause" for not dis-
missing an action that was without record activity for over one year.
X. OFFER OF JUDGMENT
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 seeks to encourage parties
to settle claims without litigation. 256 At any time, not later than 60
days before trial or less than 15 days after service of a counteroffer,
either party in an action may make an offer to settle "all pending
claims."25 7
The Florida Supreme Court's amended version of Rule: 1.442 (Of-
fer of Judgment) took effect as of January 1, 1990.258 When consider-
ing the amendment of the Rule, the court rejected the argument that
the court should declare sections 768.79 and 45.061, Florida Statutes,
unconstitutional based on possible conflicts between the statutes and
Rule 1.442, saying "[w]e agree with the Committee that sections
768.79 and 45.061 impinge upon this Court's duties in their procedural
details . . . [t]o the extent the procedural aspects of new rule 1.442 are
inconsistent . . . the rule shall supersede the statutes. 25 9
Applying only to money damages,260 offers of judgment must be
accepted within 30 days after service of the offer or the offer will be
deemed rejected.26 1 A rejection of an offer terminates the offer.26 2 A
counteroffer is also considered a rejection. 23 The court may impose
"sanctions equal to reasonable attorneys fees and all reasonable costs of
253. A & W Electric Inc. v. Abraira, 567 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
254. Id.
255. 565 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
256. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441; Aspen v. Bayless, 564 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1990).
257. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
258. 550 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1989).
259. Id. at 443.
260. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441(a).
261. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441(f)(1).
262. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441(f)(3).
263. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441(f)(2).
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the litigation accruing from the date the relevant offer of judgment was
made" '64 when the rejection of the offer was unreasonable, resulting in
further litigation costs, 6 5 and when, either the damages awarded to the
offeree "are less than 75 percent of the offer" or, "more than 125 per-
cent of the offer."2 66
Offers of judgment may not contain extraneous conditions which
must be met in order to accept the monetary settlement offer. 67 In
Martin v. Brousseau,268 the appellate court ruled that a conditional of-
fer of judgment made by the appellee was invalid because of the condi-
tions attached to the offer. The court then reversed the trial court's
decision imposing costs and attorney's fees upon the prevailing litigant
who had been awarded damages of twenty-five percent less than the
conditional offer of judgment. 69 The conditions attached to the offer of
judgment were "to execute a full and complete release and satisfaction,
a hold harmless affidavit, and a stipulation for dismissal with
prejudice. "270
In Aspen v. Bayless s71 a landmark case, the Florida Supreme
Court held that "a party is not precluded from recovering costs under
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, or after judgment in its favor,
when someone other than the named party pays or advances those
costs. '272 The court reasoned that a nonprevailing plaintiff should not
reap windfall benefits simply because litigation costs were borne by an
insurance carrier.2 3 In keeping with the goal of settling disputes with-
out going to trial, the court further reasoned that "[i]f a named insured
is unable to obtain costs under rule 1.442, there would be less incentive
to accept an offer to settle and no penalty for failing to do so. ''274 Addi-
tionally, the insurer who expends funds to pay for litigation has a right
of subrogation against the named party who was awarded costs by the
court and thus the awarding of such costs is appropriate. 275 The ruling
264. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441(h)(1) (footnote omitted).
265. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441(h)(1)(A).
266. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441(h)(1)(B)(i)(ii).
267. Martin v. Brousseau, 564 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 241.
270. Id. (footnote omitted).
271. 564 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1990).
272. Id. at 1082.
273. Id. at 1083.
274.. Id. at 1083.
275. Id. at 1082.
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in Aspen should provide guidance in the cases involving a conflict be-
tween Rule 1.442 (offers of judgment) and section 768.79, Florida
Statutes, regarding the amount of entitlement which may be taxed fol-
lowing the rejection of an offer of settlement.276
XI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In contrast with the trend toward the increased use of summary
judgment in federal courts in recent years,2 77 the Florida courts have
maintained a more conservative approach by demanding more of the
moving party. For example, in Freeman v. Fleet Supply, Inc., 78 the
court reviewed a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant in a
faulty brake case. The trial court had found that the plaintiff's allega-
tions failed to establish that the defective brakes proximately caused
his injury, based on his testimony in deposition that he had performed
a routine brake inspection before the accident, but that his knowledge
of braking systems was limited. In reversing the lower tribunal, the ap-
pellate court outlined its restrictive view that:
IT]he movant carries the considerable burden of showing conclu-
sively that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Until it is
determined that the movant has successfully met this burden, the
opposing party is under no obligation to show that there are no
issues remaining to be tried.2 71
Freeman's failure, in his deposition, to establish the exact cause of
the brake failure "did not mean that Fleet Supply had conclusively
demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. '280 Simi-
larly, in Mason v. McCrory Corp., the court found that evidence of
276. Kanaar v. Goodwin, 567 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990). In
Royster v. Van Der Meulen, 564 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990), the trial
judge denied appellant's motion to tax costs and attorney's fees because his insurance
company had paid the costs of the litigation. The first district reversed, and certified a
conflict with the 1989 second district ruling in Aspen. Oddly enough, this case was
decided on July 25, 1990 - just one day before the Florida Supreme Court ruling in
Aspen.
277. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Lib-
erty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus. Co.. Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
278. 565 So. 2d 870, 871 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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faulty shampoo packaging, "susceptible to different reasonable infer-
ences," was more than adequate to establish a jury question and defeat
a motion for summary judgment advanced by the defendant."' 1
The appellate court also found an abuse of discretion in denials of
requests for relief and rehearing in Jeff-Ray Corp. v. Jacobson,8 2
where the trial court had granted summary judgment against a party
which "made an unrebutted showing that it did not receive notice of
the summary judgment motion or hearing until receipt of the judgment
itself."2 3 In Hialeah, Inc. v. ,Adams, the appellate court found a simi-
lar abuse of discretion where the lower court had "denied the motion to
vacate solely on the basis that the registered agent's affidavit failed to
establish excusable neglect" in the mishandling of a complaint and
summons. 84 On the other hand, in Slachter v. Ahundio Inv., Co., a
case where a moving party did properly meet his burden, the simple
allegation that the non-moving party had "'meritorious defenses"' was
held to be insufficient to preclude summary judgment.28 5
XII. DIRECTED VERDICT
Motions for a directed verdict are governed by Rule 1.480.286 A
directed verdict is improper unless the evidence, viewed in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party, shows that the jury "could not rea-
sonably differ as to the existence of any material fact" and that the
moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law."'2 7 In Jones
v. Heil Co., the court overturned a directed verdict for the defendant
and held that a directed verdict will not be upheld on appeal unless no
evidence, or reasonable inferences from evidence presented, would sup-
port a jury's verdict for the non-moving party.288 While a directed ver-
dict should not be granted without serious consideration, a failure to
present competent evidence to support a claim will support the trial
court's setting aside the jury's verdict. 89 However, as the court noted
281. 567 So. 2d 1011, 1012 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
282. 566 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
283. Id.
284. 566 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
285. 566 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
286. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.480.
287. Garrahan v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 569 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
288. 566 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
289. Yanks v. Barnett, 563 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (directed
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in Reaves v. Armstrong World Industries Inc., if there is no evidence in
the record to support the jury verdict, then a directed verdict is appro-
priate.290 A directed verdict is also appropriate if a claim is barred by
an affirmative defense such as the statute of frauds.21' As the appellate
court recognized in Cho v. Mackey, certain issues, such as the question
of foreseeability prior to imposing tort liability, are questions for the
jury and a directed verdict is improper in such cases.292
Rule 1.480 requires that a motion for a directed verdict be made
at the close of all the evidence. 293 A judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict and a directed verdict are interrelated. Judgment notwithstanding
the verdict will not be entered unless a party earlier moved for a di-
rected verdict.2 4 Additionally, judgment notwithstanding the verdict is
determined under the same test as a directed verdict: "[I]t will be
granted only if there is no evidence or reasonable inference therefrom
supporting a verdict for the other party. 295
XIII. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST/COSTS AND INTEREST/
ATTORNEYS' FEES
A. Prejudgment Interest
Prejudgment interest compensates the aggrieved party for the time
and use of his money beginning on the date, as determined by the ver-
dict, when the claim began to accrue. For example, in a construction
contract, the date of accrual could be the date the claim became liqui-
dated by agreement of the parties.29 6 When there is no liquidation
agreement fixing the rate of interest in the event of a breach, a court
should impose the current statutory interest rate29 7 of 12 percent per
verdict upheld because of plaintiffs failure to present competent evidence in fraudulent
misrepresentation claim).
290. Reaves v. Armstrong World Indus., 569 So. 2d 1307, 1309 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990) (testimony insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a jury finding of
proximate causation).
291. Kay v. Katzen, 568 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
292. 567 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
293. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.480(b).
294. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner v. Anderson, 501 So. 2d 635 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App. 1986).
295. Id. at 638.
296. Delta D. Constr. Corp. v. Triangle Marine Constr., Inc., 567 So. 2d 1010
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
297. Id. at 1010.
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annum simple interest."' 8
When the statutory interest rate changes between the date of the
original judgment and a later judgment, the court will apply the rate
imposed on the date of each rendering of judgment. 99 In Herskowitz v.
Herskowitz,300 the appellate court reversed the trial court's modifica-
tion of interest on an action to enforce a judgment. The court imposed
six percent "from the entry of judgment" in June of 1972 to October
1985, "the date the judgment disposing of all pending matters was en-
tered," with twelve percent interest thereafter. 30 1 Finally, it should be
noted that while prejudgment interest is available in contract-based
causes of action - if previously pled by the prevailing party - it is not
recoverable in tort actions or usurious transactions.
B. Costs and Interest
Under section 57.041 of the Florida Statutes,302 certain legal costs
and charges may be awarded to the prevailing party in a civil action. 03
The court may award costs and attorney's fees to the prevailing plain-
tiff of the original action even if the defendant prevailed on a counter-
claim, causing both to be "prevailing parties. 304 If the significant relief
awarded to the prevailing plaintiff is "'limited in comparison to the
scope of the litigation,'" a reduced fee may be awarded at the court's
discretion.30 5 As noted by the court in Oriental Imports Inc., v. Alilin,
a trial court no longer has the discretion to deny costs to the party
prevailing in the judgment,3 06 especially when taxed for refusal of a
pre-trial offer of judgment.0 The "prevailing party" rule applies even
when the counter claimant recovers an award of damages in excess of
298. 244. FLA. STAT. § 55.031 (1989).
299. Herskowitz v. Herskowitz, 569 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. FLA. STAT. § 57.041 (1989).
303. Reinhardt v. Bono, 564 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
304. Malagon v. Solari, 566 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(a
landlord-tenant action with damages awarded under FLA. STAT. §83.49(3)(c)).
305. Id. at 354 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983)
("Where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award
only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.")).
306. Oriental Imports, Inc. v. Alilin, 559 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
307. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442; Reinhardt, 564 So. 2d 1233.
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those awarded to the prevailing plaintiff.3"' Additionally, any sales tax
incurred due to the Florida service tax on attorney's fees will be added
onto the sum total of any cost awards.30 9
The prevailing party may recover costs under Rule 1.442, even
when someone other than the named party, such as an insurer, has paid
the costs."' 0 In a case where a party is awarded costs but the actual
costs were paid by another party, no real windfall occurs because the
party who actually paid the costs of the litigation has subrogation
rights against the named party for reimbursement of those costs.311
Taxation of costs for discovery purposes, depositions, and requests
for production, are allowed or disallowed depending on whether they
serve a useful purpose in determining issues before the trial court.
However, reliance upon the information gleaned through discovery dep-
ositions is not enough to invoke taxation of those costs.3 -2 Attorneys
who are found guilty of charges brought by the Florida Bar during
disciplinary proceedings will be taxed any costs incurred by the Bar,
including witness fees. 3
While the court has great discretion in taxation of costs, the cost
of depositions should not be disallowed merely as a result of voluntary
dismissal.314 Finally, as to the appropriate amount of costs surrounding
a party's use of expert witnesses, all that is required of the court in
calculating taxation of fees for expert witnesses - who actually attend
court to testify - is consideration of a listing of itemized costs per ex-
pert witness used and a determination as to whether the cost listed was
reasonable.3 15
308. Salisbury Constr. Corp. v. Mitchell, 491 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1986).
309. See FLA.'STAT. § 57.071(3) (1989); Waller v. Baxley, 565 So. 2d 808, 809
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
310. Aspen, 564 So. 2d 1081.
311. Balseca v. Callies Electric, Inc., 566 So. 2d 322, 324 (Fla 3rd Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
312. See generally Balseca, 566 So. 2d at 328 (taxation of costs rests largely
within the discretion of the trial court).
313. The Florida Bar v. Blunt, 564 So. 2d 129, 130 (Fla. 1990).
314. Balseca, 566 So. 2d at 324; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jasiecki, 549 So. 2d 816
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
315. Balseca, 566 So. 2d at 324; Allstate, 549 So. 2d 816.
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Except where awarded by statute, 16 the taxing of attorneys' fees
is a product of the common law. Section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes
provides "for the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party where
'the court finds that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue
of either law or fact raised by the losing party.' "317 Fees are similarly
awarded to the prevailing parties of post-divorce harassment cases
through the continuous filing of motions318 and frivolous action cases
that are so devoid of merit, both on the facts and the law, as to be
completely untenable. 319
If properly pled, a motion for attorneys fees may be made after
final judgment and accompanied by proof of fees, personal testimony of
the attorney who performed the services, and sufficient proof of reason-
able time spent in arriving at the total amount of fees requested. The
Florida Supreme Court has recognized that there are different catego-
ries of attorneys fees. In Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Quan-
strom, the court stated that "different types of cases require different
criteria to achieve the legislative or court objective in authorizing the
setting of a reasonable attorney's fee."320 Because of prevailing confu-
sion among lawyers as to when the application of a multiplier is appro-
priate, the Florida Supreme Court discussed the logistics of proper
multiplier usage in Quanstrom.321 According to the court, the multi-
plier is not ordinarily used in estate and trust, eminent domain, or do-
mestic relations cases.322 In contractual disputes, the trial court should
consider: (1) the market availability of competent counsel, (2) attorney
mitigation of expenses/fees, and, (3) the relevance of the Rowe32 fac-
316. FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (Supp. 1990).
317. Simmons v. Schimmel, 476 So. 2d 1342, 1345-46 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
318. Steinfeld v. Steinfeld, 565 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Elenewski v. Elenewski, 528 So. 2d 1354, 1356 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
319. Rojas v. Drake, 569 So. 2d 859, 860 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
320. 555 So. 2d 828, 833 (Fla. 1990).
321. Id.
322. Id. Attorney's fees are usually guaranteed in the first two, while ethically
inappropriate in the later cases.
323. See Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.
1985). Fee computation should be based on: 1) number of hours reasonably spent in
litigation; 2) the reasonable hourly rate applicable to the specific type of litigation in-
volved; 3) multiply (1) and (2), and when necessary; 4) allow adjustment of the fee to
compensate for failure to prevail on the claims or based on the nature of the litigation.
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tors, especially the total amount, post litigation results, and attorney/
client fee agreements. 24 As the First District Court of Appeal noted in
Jones v. Associates Fin. Inc., the Rowe factors must be applied by the
trial court when determining attorney's fees in order to avoid reversible
error.
32 5
XIV. RES JUDICATA/COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
A final judgment will bar further litigation under principles of res
judicata (claim preclusion) when the judgment includes the identity of
the cause of action, the identity of the thing sued for, the identity of
the persons and parties to the action, and the identity of quality for or
against whom the claim is made.3 1 6 Res judicata must be pled as an
affirmative defense and is generally utilized in conjunction with a mo-
tion for summary judgment.21 Once a judgment has been entered, a
second suit, filed by the same parties or parties who could have been in
privity in the first suit, is barred by res judicata in order to inhibit the
splitting of causes of action into multiple suits.328 Exceptions to the
principle of res judicata may be raised in connection with recurring
claims; however, without proof compelling modification of a previous
final order, non-recurring issues which were clearly litigated in the first
suit are barred by res judicata in all subsequent suits for recurring
damages.3 29
Under res judicata or claim preclusion (also sometimes referred to
as estoppel by judgment), all matters that were part of the initial cause
of action are said to be merged into the final judgment and a party is
said to be barred from relitigating any matters that were, or could have
been, included as a part of that cause of action. The'principle problem
Id.
324. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 834; see also Sun Bank v. Ford, 564 So. 2d 1078,
1080 (Fla. 1990) (trial judge appropriately set the attorney's fees by the terms of the
promissory note, $150/hr for the time reasonably spent).
325. Jones v. Associates Fin., Inc., 565 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
326. Personnel One, Inc. v. John Sommerer & Co., 564 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
327. Id. at 1218.
328. DeCarlo v. Palm Beach Auto Brokers, Inc., 566 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990).
329. See, e.g., Nelson & Co. v. Holtzclaw, 566 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App. 1990) (worker's compensation case); Walker v. Walker, 566 So. 2d 1350
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (child support case).
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of the application of claim preclusion generally concerns whether a
matter which was not litigated could have been litigated as part of the
cause of action. Issue preclusion or collateral estoppel (also sometimes
called estoppel by verdict) precludes relitigation of an issue that was
actually litigated and necessary to the holding. Three typical problems
emerge in reference to collateral estoppel: (1) is it the same identical
issue (i.e. same burden of proof); (2) was the litigated issue necessary
to the court's judgment; and (3) whether the requirement of mutuality
should be relaxed so that issue preclusion can be used as a shield or a
sword.
When the first and second suits involve different causes of action
between the same parties or parties who were in privity in the first suit,
the doctrine of collateral estoppel is invoked; thus, the parties are es-
topped from litigating any common issues that were actually adjudi-
cated in prior litigation.33 0 One example of collateral estoppel is seen in
section 775.089(8) of Florida Statutes,33 1 which dictates that, in civil
suits for restitution arising from criminal convictions, collateral estop-
pel prevents the denial of any essential allegations which led to the
criminal conviction in the previous proceeding.332
"Collateral Estoppel" (issue preclusion) and its synonymous term
"estoppel by verdict" should not be confused with "estoppel by judg-
ment" which refers to a res judicata bar (claim preclusion). Because of
the confusion that could result, even synonymous terms should not be
redundantly used together.3 33 Some Florida courts have used these
terms interchangeably, much to the befuddlement of the reader. It
would be helpful if Florida courts would adopt the definitions used by
the Restatement of Judgments (Second) in order to provide greater
uniformity.334
The modern view, allowing the use of collateral estoppel as a
"sword" or a "shield," has been accepted by the United States Su-
preme Court in the landmark cases of Blonder-Tongue Laboratories.,
Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,"5 and Parklane Hosiery Co.
330. Personnel One, Inc. 564 So. 2d 1217.
331. Fla. Stat § 775.089(8) (1989).
332. Paterno v. Fernandez, 569 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
333. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Russell, 567 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
334. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980).
335. 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (defensive "shield" usage - defendant in second patent
infringement suit was able to defeat the action because the plaintiff had previously lost
on an infringement action on the same patent against a different defendant).
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v. Shore.3 '
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are dependant upon the entry
of a final judgment or order.33 7 When the order is not final - such as
when an evidentiary hearing is required or when a petition for a writ of
certiorari is denied without an opinion, or when the first case is dis-
missed for lack of prosecution or as a sanction without adjudication on
the merits - the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel may
not be invoked in the case.38" In the absence of a reversal, an order or
judgment that is voidable bars later adjudication for res judicata
purposes.339
336. 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (offensive "sword" usage - plaintiff was able to prevail
in second suit by using a prior determination in an action by the United States against
the same defendant).
337. DeCarlo, 566 So. 2d 318.
338. See, e.g., Accent Realty, Inc. v. Crudele, 496 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1986).
339. See, e.g., Walker v. Walker, 566 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1990); HRS v. Morley, 570 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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